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Behavioural Motives Within European Climate Policy and Their Implications for the Fulfilment of the European Kyoto Target

 
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Behavioural Motives Within European Climate Policy and Their Implications for the Fulfilment of the European Kyoto Target

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Lückge, Helen 2005: Behavioural Motives Within European Climate Policy and Their Implications for the Fulfilment of the European Kyoto Target. Ecologic Institute, Berlin.

As the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol from 2008 to 2012 is drawing near, it is becoming evident that some countries will face major difficulties in fulfilling their commitments under the EU Burden Sharing Agreement, while other countries are already close to achieving their targets. What is the motivation of countries that carry out an effective climate policy, and how do countries that are far away from achieving their reduction targets justify their behaviour? In her essay on European climate policy, Helen Lückge looks at these questions from an economic point of view.

This essay uses a game-theoretical approach as well as ideas from the New Political Economy to explain different behavioural motives to explain why some countries commit themselves to climate policy while others stay reluctant.

For Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain, it then analyses three different fields of climate policy – the use of market-based instruments, support for renewable energies and the use of JI and CDM – to show where these motives actually can be found within the policies of major greenhouse gas emitting countries in the EU.

A summary of the different fields of climate policy shows that mainly one motive prevails in each country so that countries can be identified as being either a “pusher” or a “dragger”.

The essay is available for download [pdf, 194 KB, English].

This essay is an updated and shortened version of Helen Lückge’s diploma thesis.

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English
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29 pp.
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Keywords
Climate policy, game theory, New Political Economy